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WHAT LIES BENEATH SECTION 956(C)(1)(D): DOES AN INTANGIBLE 
PROPERTY RIGHT CONSTITUTE AN INVESTMENT IN U.S. PROPERTY? 
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Abstract 
Controlled foreign corporations with U.S. shareholders often engage 
in business activities within the United States, which includes the 
establishment of intangible property rights in the United States. In so 
doing, the controlled foreign corporation’s U.S. shareholders may be 
subject to immediate taxation in the United States on some or all of such 
corporation’s earnings under section 956 of the Internal Revenue Code if 
the establishment of intangible property rights by the controlled foreign 
corporation in the United States is considered an investment in U.S. 
property. Making this determination depends on proper interpretation 
and application of section 956(c)(1)(D), for which little guidance has 
been issued by the Internal Revenue Service, and for which no court 
rulings have specifically been issued. 
This article, therefore, evaluates whether the establishment of 
intangible property rights by controlled foreign corporations in the 
United States ought to be considered investments in U.S. property. More 
specifically, this article will analyze the scope of section 956(c)(1)(D) in 
terms of the intangible property rights covered by the statute and 
examine when such property rights are considered “used” in the United 
States, as well as the meaning of “acquired or developed by the 
controlled foreign corporation for use in the United States.” Prior to 
discussing these items, this article will provide some general background 
information on the U.S. anti-deferral regime, including the subpart F 
provisions (sections 951-964) which constitute a major component of the 
regime. 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
In 1962, Congress enacted the U.S. anti-deferral regime. Under this 
regime, a controlled foreign corporation that has the “right to the use in 
the United States”1 of certain kinds of intangible property rights may be 
considered to hold an investment in U.S. property. In particular, certain 
intangible property rights are considered to be an investment in U.S. 
property if the controlled foreign corporation has the right to the use in 
                                                          
* J.D., C.P.A.; Professor, Thomas M. Cooley Law School, Grand Rapids, Michigan; Temple 
University School of Law, J.D., 1992; Western Michigan University, B.B.A. and B.S., 1987.  
1 I.R.C. § 956(c)(1)(D) (West 2007). 
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the United States of such property rights, and the right to the use of such 
property rights were acquired or developed by the controlled foreign 
corporation for use in the United States.
2
 Once it is established that the 
intangible property rights constitute an investment in U.S. property, the 
U.S. shareholders of the controlled foreign corporation are subject to 
immediate U.S. taxation on their pro-rata share of such corporation’s 
increase in investment of earnings in such U.S. property.
3
 
Because the United States may represent a major market for many 
controlled foreign corporations, it is prudent for such corporations to 
seek the protection of U.S. intellectual property law to protect their 
intangible property rights from any potential infringing activities in the 
United States. In doing so, the U.S. shareholders of these controlled 
foreign corporations could be subject to immediate U.S. taxation on 
some or all of such corporations’ earnings to the extent of the intangible 
properties’ adjusted bases.4 
This issue is equally applicable to U.S. corporations or their 
controlled foreign corporations that acquired stock in a foreign 
corporation and made an election under section 338
5
 – i.e., the deemed 
new controlled foreign corporation could be treated as investing in U.S. 
property to the extent of the fair market value of any intangible property 
deemed acquired if there is a right to the use of such property in the 
United States. In other words, as a result of the section 338 election, the 
deemed new controlled foreign corporation would step-up its asset basis, 
including its intangible property, with reference to the amount the U.S. 
corporation or its controlled foreign corporation paid for the stock in the 
deemed new controlled foreign corporation. Therefore, the deemed new 
controlled foreign corporation now has an adjusted basis in the acquired 
foreign corporation’s internally developed intangible property; hence, the 
U.S. shareholders of the deemed new controlled foreign corporation 
could be subject to immediate U.S. taxation on some or all of such 
corporations’ earnings. 
So, one important question becomes: Does a controlled foreign 
corporation’s right to sell a patented product manufactured outside the 
United States into the U.S. market constitute an investment in U.S. 
property? Suffice it to say, the answer to this question is of critical 
importance to certain U.S. shareholders of controlled foreign 
                                                          
2 Id. 
3 I.R.C. § 956(a) (West 2007). 
4 Id. 
5 26 C.F.R. § 1.338-1 (2009). (“Deemed transaction. Elections are available under section 338 
when a purchasing corporation acquires stock of another corporation (the target) in a qualified stock 
purchase…Although target is a single corporation under corporate law, if a section 338 election is 
made, then two separate corporations, old target and new target, generally are considered to 
exist…Old target is treated as transferring all of its assets to an unrelated person in exchange for 
consideration that includes the discharge of its liabilities…and new target is treated as acquiring all 
of its assets from an unrelated person in exchange for consideration that includes the assumption of 
those liabilities.” (Such transaction is, without regard to its characterization for Federal income tax 
purposes, referred to as the deemed asset sale and the income tax consequences thereof as the 
deemed sale tax consequences.))  
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corporations. Unfortunately, little guidance has been issued by the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and no court rulings have specifically 
dealt with this topic. 
This article will evaluate whether intangible property rights held by a 
controlled foreign corporation in the United States constitute an 
investment in U.S. property. More specifically, this article will analyze 
the scope of section 956(c)(1)(D) in terms of the intangible property 
rights covered by the statute and examine when such property rights are 
considered “used” in the United States, as well as the meaning of 
“acquired or developed by the controlled foreign corporation for use in 
the United States.” Prior to discussing these items, this paper will 
provide background information on the U.S. anti-deferral regime, 
including the subpart F provisions (sections 951-964) which constitute a 
major component of the regime. 
II.   U.S. ANTI-DEFERRAL REGIME – GENERAL BACKGROUND 
As a general rule, foreign-source income earned by a foreign 
corporation, controlled or uncontrolled, is not subject to U.S. taxation 
until such earnings are repatriated as a dividend to its U.S. shareholders, 
at which point the shareholders are taxed on the foreign-source income. 
In 1961, the Kennedy Administration advocated to end avoidance of U.S. 
taxation on foreign-source income by U.S. persons with control of 
foreign corporations.
6
 With the exception of income from investment in 
under-developed, non-tax haven countries, the Kennedy Administration 
recommended the adoption of new legislation to subject U.S. 
corporations (and U.S. individual shareholders of closely-held foreign 
corporations) to immediate U.S. taxation on their pro-rata share of each 
foreign subsidiary’s current undistributed profits. 
The following is an excerpt from President Kennedy’s “Message from 
the President of the United States Relative to Our Federal Income Tax 
System,” dated April 20, 1961, to Congress, wherein he expressed the 
Administration’s position on the tax treatment of foreign-source income: 
Profits earned abroad by American firms operating 
through foreign subsidiaries are, under present tax laws, 
subject to United States tax only when they are returned 
to the parent company in the form of dividends. In some 
cases, this tax deferral has made possible indefinite 
postponement of the United States tax; and, in those 
countries where income taxes are lower than in the 
United States, the ability to defer the payment of U.S. 
                                                          
6 Section 7701(a)(30) defines “U.S. person” to include all citizens and residents of the United 
States as well as United States entities such as corporations and partnerships, and certain estates and 
trusts not classified as foreign. Section 7701(b) determines whether a non-U.S. citizen is a resident 
of the United States. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30) (West 2010). 
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tax by retaining income in the subsidiary companies 
provides a tax advantage for companies operating 
through overseas subsidiaries that is not available to 
companies operating solely in the United States . . . .  
The undesirability of continuing deferral is 
underscored where deferral has served as a shelter for 
tax escape through the unjustifiable use of tax havens 
such as Switzerland. Recently more and more enterprises 
organized abroad by American firms have arranged their 
corporate structures—aided by artificial arrangements 
between parent and subsidiary regarding intercompany 
pricing, the transfer of patent licensing rights, the 
shifting of management fees, and similar practices which 
maximize the accumulation of profits in the tax haven—
so as to exploit the multiplicity of foreign tax systems 
and international agreements in order to reduce sharply 
or eliminate completely their tax liabilities both at home 
and abroad . . . . 
To the extent that these tax havens and other tax 
deferral privileges result in U.S. firm investing or 
locating abroad largely for tax reasons, the efficient 
allocation of international resources is upset, the initial 
drain on our already adverse balance of payments is 
never fully compensated, and profits are retained and 
reinvested abroad which would otherwise be invested in 
the United States
7
 
The Kennedy Administration’s proposal was countered by the 
argument that an end to deferral would prevent U.S. multinational 
corporations from effectively competing in the global marketplace. As a 
compromise, Congress enacted the subpart F rules, as part of the U.S. 
anti-deferral regime, in 1962. These rules only apply to U.S. shareholders 
who own,
8
 in aggregate, more than fifty percent of a foreign 
corporation’s stock, by vote or value, which would define the foreign 
corporation as a controlled foreign corporation (CFC).
9
  
                                                          
7 John F. Kennedy, President Kennedy Appeals to the Congress for a Tax Cut, NATIONAL 
CENTER (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.nationalcenter.org/JFKTaxes1961.html. 
8 Section 951(b) defines a “U.S. shareholder” as a U.S. person (including a U.S. corporation) 
who owns (directly, indirectly or constructively under the ownership rule of section 958) “10 percent 
or more of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote” of a foreign 
corporation. As mentioned above, section 957(c) defines a U.S. person to include all citizens and 
residents of the United States as well as United States entities such as corporations and partnerships, 
and certain estates and trusts not classified as foreign. Section 7701(b) determines whether a non-
U.S. citizen is a resident of the United States. I.R.C. § 951 (West 2007). 
9 Section 957(a) defines a “controlled foreign corporation” as “any foreign corporation if more 
than 50 percent of (1) the total combined voting power of all classes of stock of such corporation 
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With respect to a U.S. shareholder of a CFC, the subpart F rules 
require current taxation of both subpart F income and earnings invested 
in certain U.S. property. In particular, these rules target certain types of 
income earned by a CFC, such as passive income and income earned 
through a CFC located in a tax haven (subpart F income), and subjects its 
U.S. shareholders to immediate U.S. taxation on their pro rata share of 
the CFC’s subpart F income.10 These rules also subject U.S. shareholders 
of a CFC to immediate U.S. taxation on their pro-rata share of any 
increase in a CFC’s investment of earnings in U.S. property as 
determined under section 956.
11
 
IV.   SECTION 956 – INVESTMENT IN U.S. PROPERTY 
Section 956 was targeted at U.S. shareholders who were repatriating 
foreign earnings and profits from CFCs disguised as various non-taxable 
transactions such as loans from the CFCs to their U.S. shareholders or as 
investments by the CFCs in their U.S. shareholders’ stock. Congress was 
clearly concerned with U.S. shareholders who were acquiring the use of 
their CFCs’ earnings and profits in the United States while avoiding U.S. 
taxation. To prevent this perceived abuse, Congress wrote section 956 in 
such a way that an amount invested in U.S. property is treated as a 
constructive dividend paid by a CFC to its U.S. shareholders, who are 
thereby taxed on their allocable share of the CFC’s investment in U.S. 
property. 
More specifically, a U.S. shareholder of a CFC is subject to 
immediate U.S. taxation for any taxable year on the lesser of (1) the U.S. 
shareholder’s pro-rata share of the average of the “amount of U.S. 
property” held (directly or indirectly) by the CFC as of the close of each 
quarter of the taxable year, less the amount of undistributed earnings and 
profits included in the U.S. shareholder’s income under section 956 in 
prior years (or would have been included in the U.S. shareholder’s 
income under section 956 if such earnings and profits had not been 
                                                                                                                                  
entitled to vote, or (2) the total value of the stock of such corporation, is owned (within the meaning 
of section 958(a)), or is considered as owned by applying the rules of ownership of section 958(b), 
by United States shareholders on any day during the taxable year of such foreign corporation.” 
I.R.C. § 957 (West 2007). 
10 Section 951(a)(1)(A)(i) provides that “[i]f a foreign corporation is a controlled foreign 
corporation for an uninterrupted period of 30 days or more during any taxable year, every person 
who is a United States shareholder…of such corporation and who owns…stock of such corporation 
on the last day, in such year, on which such corporation is a controlled foreign corporation shall 
include in his gross income, for his taxable year in which or with which such taxable year of the 
corporation ends the sum of his pro rate share…of the corporation’s subpart F income for such 
year.” I.R.C. § 951 (West 2007). 
11 Section 951(a)(1)(B) provides that “[i]f a foreign corporation is a controlled foreign 
corporation for an uninterrupted period of 30 days or more during any taxable year, every person 
who is a United States shareholder…of such corporation and who owns…stock of such corporation 
on the last day, in such year, on which such corporation is a controlled foreign corporation shall 
include in his gross income, for his taxable year in which or with which such taxable year of the 
corporation ends…the amount determined under section 956 with respect to such shareholder for 
such year (but only to the extent not excluded from gross income under section 959(a)(2).” Id. 
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previously taxed as Subpart F income), or (2) the U.S. shareholder’s pro 
rata share of the CFC’s “applicable earnings.”12 The amount taken into 
account with respect to the U.S. property shall be its adjusted basis as 
determined for purposes of computing earnings and profits, reduced by 
any liability to which the property is subject.
13
 The term “applicable 
earnings” means the CFC’s earnings and profits (current and 
accumulated in prior years) reduced by the sum of (1) current year 
distributions, and (2) accumulated earnings and profits included in the 
U.S. shareholder’s income under section 956 in prior years (or would 
have been included in the U.S. shareholder’s income under section 956 if 
such earnings and profits had not been previously taxed as Subpart F 
income).
14
 
The term “United States property” is defined in section 956(c)(1), 
which reads as follows: 
(1) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of subsection (a), the 
term “United States property” means any property 
acquired after December 31, 1962, which is  
(A) tangible property located in the United States; 
(B) stock of a U.S. corporation; 
(C) an obligation of a U.S. person; or  
(D) any right to the use in the United States  
 of- 
(i) a patent or copyright,  
(ii) an invention, model, or design (whether or 
not patented),  
(iii) a secret formula or process, or  
(iv) any other similar right, which is acquired or 
developed by the controlled foreign corporation 
for use in the United States [emphasis added].
15
 
With that said, there are certain exceptions to the definition of 
“United States property,” such as government obligations, bank deposits, 
property purchased for export, and certain trade or business obligations.
16
 
If a CFC also has previously taxed subpart F income, any amounts 
invested in U.S. property under section 956 shall be excluded from the 
U.S. shareholders’ gross income to the extent attributable to previously 
taxed subpart F income, and taxation will, therefore, only occur under 
section 956 when the amounts invested in U.S. property exceed 
previously taxed subpart F income.
17
 
 
                                                          
12 I.R.C. § 956(a) (West 2007). 
13 Id. 
14 I.R.C. § 956(b)(1) (West 2007). 
15 I.R.C. § 956(c)(1) (West 2007). 
16 I.R.C. § 956(c)(2) (West 2007). 
17 I.R.C. § 959(a) (West 2007). 
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V.   SECTION 956(C)(1)(D) – SCOPE OF INTANGIBLE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
A literal reading of section 956(c)(1)(D) appears to limit intangible 
property rights to production intangible property rights: the specifically 
listed intangibles (i.e., patents, copyrights, inventions, models, designs, 
secret formulas or processes) all relate to intangible property rights that 
are used to produce or manufacture a product or products (production 
intangible property rights). There is no mention in section 956(c)(1)(D) 
of any intangibles that relate to intangible property rights that are used to 
market and sell a product or products (marketing intangible property 
rights), such as trademarks, trade names and brand names, or general 
intangible property rights, such as goodwill and going concern values. 
Therefore, the phrase “any other similar property right” in section 
956(c)(1)(iv) should be interpreted as “any other similar production 
intangible property right.” 
In an article written by Ken Brewer and Bruce Reynolds,
18
 the authors 
made the following observation: 
In subparagraph (1) [Section 956(c)(1)], Congress 
addressed tangible property within the reach of section 
956 by the phrase “any property…which is tangible 
property located in the United States.” If, in addition to 
all types of tangible property, Congress had also 
intended to capture all types of intangibles, a similar 
phraseology would have been called for. The language 
actually chosen gives no indication of such an intention. 
The subparagraph specifically mentioned types of 
production intangibles, and is silent on trademarks, 
brand names, or any other kinds of marketing 
intangibles. It would seem curious that Congress would 
attempt to achieve broad coverage of all intangible 
property rights by explicitly listing only a few examples 
of one fairly narrow category of intangibles (i.e., 
production intangibles), but not make any attempt to 
describe the broader category. 
It is equally difficult to reconcile the notion that 
subparagraph (D) [Section 956(c)(1)(D)] encompasses 
all intangible property with the fact that section 956 
specifically deals with two other types of intangible 
property; that is, corporate stock and financial 
obligations, in subparagraphs (B) and (C) [Sections 
956(c)(1)(B) and 956(c)(1)(C)]. If subparagraph (D) was 
                                                          
18 Ken Brewer and Bruce Reynolds, Some Intangibles May be Untouched by US Internal 
Revenue Code Section 956, 21 Tax Notes Int’l 1791 (Oct. 16, 2000) [hereinafter Brewer and 
Reynolds]. 
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intended to cover all types of intangibles, subparagraphs 
(B) and (C) are superfluous.
19
 
In other words, if the intent of Congress was to pull all intangible 
property rights within the scope of section 956, they could have simply 
drafted section 956(c)(1) to read as follows:  
(1) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of subsection (a), the 
term “United States property” means any property 
acquired after December 31, 1962, which is  
(A) tangible property located in the United States; or 
(B) any right to the use in the United States of 
intangible property which is acquired or developed 
by the CFC for use in the United States. 
Furthermore, after reviewing the legislative history surrounding the 
enactment of section 956, Brewer and Reynolds concluded that Congress 
intended to limit the scope of section 956 to intangible property rights 
that are used in producing or manufacturing a product or products – i.e., 
production intangible property rights. In particular, Brewer and Reynolds 
noted that the list of intangibles under section 956(c)(1)(D) and section 
1249 are virtually identical to each other.
20
 More importantly, both code 
sections originated from the same 1962 House bill addressing income 
derived from patents, copyrights, and exclusive formulas and processes 
which were developed, created or produced in the United States, or, 
alternatively, acquired directly or indirectly from related U.S. persons.
21
 
                                                          
19 Id. at 1792. 
20 Id. at 1793-95. 
21 Section 13 of the original House bill proposed that: 
(c) Income from United States patents, copyrights, and exclusive formulas and processes. — 
Paragraph (1) defines the term “income from United States patents, copyrights, and exclusive 
formulas and processes” as used in section 952(a)(1)(B). Such term means the amount of gross 
rentals, royalties, or other income derived from the license, sublicense, sale, exchange, use, or other 
means of exploitation of patents, copyrights, and exclusive formulas and processes which are – 
(1) either substantially developed, created, or produced in the United States, or 
(2) acquired from (A) a United States person which, directly or indirectly, owns or controls the 
controlled foreign corporation, (B) a United States person owned or controlled, directly or 
indirectly, by the controlled foreign corporation, or (C) a United States person which is, 
directly or indirectly, under common ownership or control with the controlled foreign 
corporation. 
The amount described in the preceding sentence is reduced by the cost and expense allowance 
defined in section 952(c)(2). Under this definition, if a domestic corporation develops in the United 
States an exclusive process to be used in the production of a certain product, and a right (whether 
exclusive or nonexclusive) to use this process is granted to a controlled foreign corporation, the 
income derived from the use of such process by such controlled foreign corporation would be treated 
as income derived from a United States exclusive process. H.R. Rep. 1447, pt. 2, (1962).  
Section 16 of the Senate bill deleted section 13 of the original House bill and substituted a new 
section 1249 relating to the transfer of the intangible property rights contained in the original House 
bill to a controlled foreign corporation, which provided that: 
[G]ain from the sale or exchange after December 31, 1962, of certain intangible property rights 
to a controlled foreign corporation by a U.S. shareholder is to be treated as ordinary income rather 
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Therefore, it would be reasonable to conclude that the scope of these two 
code sections would be virtually identical as well. Although the Treasury 
Regulations under section 956(c)(1)(D) do not expand on the phrase “any 
other similar property right,” the Treasury Regulations under section 
1249 provide as follows: 
[I]f gain is recognized from the sale or exchange after 
December 31, 1962, of a patent, an invention, model, or 
design (whether or not patented), a copyright, a secret 
formula or process, or any other similar property right 
(not including property such as goodwill, a trademark, 
or a trade brand) to any foreign corporation by any 
United States person…which controls such foreign 
corporation, and if such gain would (but for the 
provisions of section 1249) be gain from the sale or 
exchange of a capital asset or of property described in 
section 1231, then such gain shall be considered as gain 
from the sale or exchange of property which is neither a 
capital asset nor property described in section 1231 
[emphasis added].
22
  
The fact that the Treasury Regulations under section 1249 specifically 
excludes marketing intangible property rights further supports the 
conclusion that the scope of intangible property rights contained in 
section 956(c)(1)(D) should also be so limited. Additional support for 
                                                                                                                                  
than as capital gain. The type of property, the transfer of which will lead to this ordinary income 
treatment, is:— 
(1) a patent; 
(2) an invention, 
(3) a model or design (whether or not patented), 
(4) a copyright, 
(5) a secret formula or process, or 
(6) any other similar property rights. 
This ordinary income treatment, however, is not to apply in the case of gain realized from the 
sale or exchange for stock or contribution to capital of such property if it is established to the 
satisfaction of the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate that the principal purpose of the transfer 
was to enable the foreign corporation to use the property in its own manufacturing operations. S. 
Rep. No. 1881 (Part 2 of 7), 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1963-3 C.B. 707 (Aug. 16, 1962)  
The final version of section 956(c)(1)(D), as enacted by the Revenue Act of 1962, is a 
combination of the original House bill and the Senate amendments, providing the following: 
(1) IN GENERAL.--For purposes of subsection (a) [Section 956(a)], the term “United States 
property” means any property acquired after December 31, 1962, which is—… 
(D) any right to the use in the United States of –  
(i) a patent or copyright, 
(ii) an invention, model, or design (whether or not patented),(iii) a secret formula or 
process, or     
(iv) any other similar property right,  
which is acquired or developed by the controlled foreign corporation for use in the United 
States. Revenue Act of 1962, P.L. 87-834, H.R. 10650 76 Stat. 960 (1962). 
22 26 C.F.R. §1.1249-1(a) (2009). 
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this conclusion is also found in other code sections that deal with 
intangible property rights.
23
 
For example, section 936, which deals with the possessions tax credit, 
includes a list of intangible property rights that are subject to its 
provisions. The term “intangible property income” means the gross 
income of a corporation attributable to any intangible property.
24
 The 
term “intangible property” is defined to include any of the following: 
(i) patent, invention, formula, process, design, 
pattern, or knowhow; 
(ii) copyright, literary, musical, or artistic 
composition; 
(iii) trademark, trade name, or brand name; 
(iv) franchise, license, or contract; 
(v) method, program, system, procedure, campaign, 
survey, study, forecast, estimate, customer list, or 
technical data; or 
(vi) any item similar, which has substantial value 
independent of the services of an individual.
25
 
Clearly, Congress intended that this list of intangibles encompass 
both production and marketing intangibles. Furthermore, Congress 
included a catchall provision in category (vi) – i.e., “any item similar,” 
which expressed its intent to also encompass any intangible that is 
similar to the production or marketing intangibles described in categories 
(i) through (v). Although Congress used a similar catchall provision in 
section 956(c)(1)(D)(iv) – i.e. “any other similar property right,” the list 
of intangibles in section 956(c)(1)(D) only encompassed production 
intangibles. Therefore, the catchall provision of category (vi) above 
could be distinguished with the catchall provision used in section 
956(c)(1)(D)(iv) by claiming that Congress intended to only encompass 
intangible property rights similar to the production intangible property 
rights described in sections 956(c)(1)(D)(i)-(iii). 
Also, section 197, which deals with special amortization rules, 
includes a list of “section 197 intangibles” that are subject to its 
provisions. Essentially, an amortization deduction is allowed with respect 
to any amortizable “section 197 intangible” that is acquired after August 
10, 1993, and held in connection with a trade or business or in an activity 
engaged in for the production of income, equal to such intangible’s 
adjusted basis amortized ratably over a 15-year period beginning with the 
                                                          
23 See Brewer and Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1795-96. 
24 I.R.C. § 936(h)(3)(A) (West 2007). This section does not apply to intangible property which 
has been licensed to a corporation since prior to 1948 and is in use by such corporation on the date of 
the enactment of this subparagraph. 
25 I.R.C. § 936(h)(3)(B) (West 2007). 
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month in which such intangible was acquired.
26
 The term “section 197 
intangible” is defined to include any of the following: 
(A) goodwill, 
(B) going concern value, 
(C) any of the following intangible items: 
(i) workforce in place, including its composition 
and terms and conditions (contractual or 
otherwise) of its employment, 
(ii) business books and records, operating 
systems, or any other information base 
(including lists or other information with respect 
to current or prospective customers), 
(iii) any patent, copyright, formula, process, 
design, pattern, know-how, format, or other 
similar item, 
(iv) any customer-based intangible, 
(v) any supplier-based intangible, and 
(vi) any other similar item, 
(D) any license, permit, or other right granted by a 
governmental unit or an agency or instrumentality 
thereof, 
(E) any covenant not to compete (or other 
arrangement to the extent such arrangement has 
substantially the same effect as a covenant not to 
compete) entered into in connection with an 
acquisition (directly or indirectly) of an interest in a 
trade or business or a substantial portion thereof, and 
(F) any franchise, trademark, or trade name.
27
 
Obviously, this list of intangibles is more expansive than the list of 
intangibles provided in section 936, and it is significantly more 
expansive than the list of intangibles provided in sections 956(c)(1)(D) 
and 1249. Once again, Congress clearly intended that this list of 
intangibles be comprehensive and encompass a broad range of 
intangibles, including production, marketing and general intangibles. 
Interestingly, the list of intangibles in category (iii) above is 
substantively identical to the list provided in section 956(c)(1)(D), 
including the catchall provision. Therefore, a strong argument could be 
made that the remainder of the “section 197 intangibles” listed above are 
outside the scope of intangible property rights under section 
956(c)(1)(D). 
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27 I.R.C. § 197(d)(1) (West 2007). 
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VI.   SECTION 956(C)(1)(D) – USE OF INTANGIBLE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
If we accept the premise that the scope of “intangible property rights” 
under section 956(c)(1)(D) is limited to production intangibles property 
rights, the next step in the analysis is to determine whether there is a 
“right to the use” of the production intangible property rights in the 
United States. Although this step applies a fairly objective standard, the 
final step in the analysis requires a subjective inquiry into the intent of 
the CFC in acquiring or creating the production intangible property 
rights. More specifically, did the CFC acquire or develop the production 
intangible property rights “for use in the United States?” Unfortunately, a 
limited amount of authority exists regarding the meaning of the phrase 
“acquired or developed by the controlled foreign corporation for use in 
the United States.” 
Under section 956, the Treasury Regulations provide that: 
Whether a right described in this subdivision [an 
intangible property right] has been acquired or 
developed for use in the United States by any person is 
to be determined from all the facts and circumstances of 
each case. As a general rule, a right actually used 
principally in the United States will be considered to 
have been acquired or developed for use in the United 
States in the absence of affirmative evidence showing 
that the right was not so acquired or developed for such 
use [emphasis added].
28
 
Therefore, even if the production intangible property was acquired or 
developed outside of the United States, there is a presumption that the 
production intangible property rights were acquired or developed for use 
in the United States if such property rights were put to actual use 
principally in the United States. This presumption, however, may be 
rebutted with affirmative evidence showing that the production 
intangible property rights were not so acquired or developed for use 
principally in the United States. Alternatively stated, the Treasury 
Regulations provide that the production intangible property rights will 
not constitute “United States property” if the taxpayer can show that such 
property rights either: 1) were not actually used principally by the CFC 
in the United States and the IRS is unable to present affirmative evidence 
showing that such property rights were acquired or developed by the 
CFC with the intent to use principally in the United States, or 2) were not 
acquired or developed by the CFC with the intent to use principally in 
the United States. So, what is meant by the words “used principally” in 
the United States? 
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If a CFC is manufacturing products in the United States or has 
assigned its right to manufacture products in the United States to another 
party, related or unrelated, that is manufacturing products within the 
United States, in exchange for royalty payments, any production 
intangible property rights affirmatively used and actively exploited in the 
manufacturing process should be treated as “used” in the United States. 
The only issue is whether the CFC’s or the licensee’s “use” of these 
production intangible property rights is “principally” in the United 
States. However, this argument loses it strength if a CFC merely sells a 
patented product in the U.S. market, which was manufactured outside the 
United States. In other words, should the mere sale of a patented product 
by a CFC in the U.S. market, which was manufactured outside the 
United States, constitute a “use” of production intangible property rights 
“principally” in the United States? 
As a legal matter, Title 35 U.S.C. 154(a)(1) provides as follows: 
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention 
and a grant to the patentee [an inventor], his heirs or 
assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, 
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention 
throughout the United States or importing the invention 
into the United States, and, if the invention is a process, 
of the right to exclude others from using, offering for 
sale or selling throughout the United States, or importing 
into the United States, products made by that process, 
referring to the specification for the particular thereof. 
In other words, once an inventor legally-protects its “right to the use” 
of an invention in the United States, U.S. patent law provides them with 
the exclusive rights to use such invention in the United States. Under 
section 956, a literal reading of the Treasury Regulations recited above, 
in contrast, seems to place the emphasis on the “actual use” of 
production intangible property rights “principally” in the United States, 
or the “intent to use” production intangibles property rights “principally” 
in the United States,
29
 rather than whether the “right to the use” 
production intangible property rights is one protected by U.S. intellectual 
property law. 
So, the questions becomes: If a CFC manufactures its patented 
products outside the United States, does the exclusive right to sell its 
patented products in the U.S. market and exclude others from infringing 
on its patent rights in the United States constitute a “use” of production 
intangible property rights in the United States? More importantly, if an 
argument is successfully made that the exclusive rights mentioned above 
constitute a “use” by the CFC of its production intangible property rights 
                                                          
29 Id. 
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in the United States, were such property rights acquired or developed by 
the CFC with the intent to use principally in the United States? As 
discussed below, the answer is, arguably, no. 
In an article written by Gary Sprague and Lothar Determann, the 
authors recalled the nature and function of intellectual property rights: 
Intellectual property laws are intended to incentivize and 
reward innovation by providing creators with a right to 
exclude others from reaping the fruits of the creator’s 
intellectual labor. Such a right to exclude can be 
commercialized in two ways. First, the intellectual 
property owner can earn money by selling copies or 
other embodiments of the innovation. In this scenario, 
the intellectual property owner is not actually invoking 
its exclusion rights, but presumably it can extract a 
higher market price by being able to potentially exclude 
other suppliers from the particular market. Alternatively, 
the intellectual property owner can charge others for the 
permission (i.e., license) to sell copies or other 
embodiments of the innovation.
30
 
For example, assume a CFC opts to commercialize its production 
intangible property rights (i.e., patents, copyrights, inventions, models, 
designs, secret formulas and processes, and other similar property rights) 
by manufacturing its products in Country Z and selling a substantial 
portion of its production output in the United States. Due to the volume 
of sales in the U.S. market, the CFC seeks the protection of U.S. 
intellectual property law to protect its production intangible property 
rights from any potential infringing activities in the United States, 
thereby establishing legally protected production intangible property 
rights in the United States. Country Z was selected as the best 
manufacturing location based on a number of economic factors, 
including, but not limited to, access to capital, key management 
personnel, costs of production, logistics, skilled labor, regulatory 
environment, and access to raw materials. Also, the CFC possessed the 
requisite infrastructure and manufacturing know-how to affirmatively 
use and actively exploit its production intangible property rights in its 
physical production facilities located in Country Z. 
Suffice it to say, the CFC has no physical presence in the United 
States. The CFC is not affirmatively using or actively exploiting its 
production intangible property rights by producing products in the 
United States. Furthermore, the CFC has not assigned its production 
intangible property rights to others to affirmatively use and actively 
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exploit such property rights through production activities in the United 
States. Last, but not least, the CFC is not excluding others from 
affirmatively using and actively exploiting its production intangible 
property rights in the United States (“negative and dormant production 
intangible property right”). By selling its products in the United States, 
the only right the CFC is affirmatively using and actively exploiting is 
the right to sell products produced with its production intangibles in 
country Z in the U.S. market. 
Nevertheless, if you were to accept the position that a mere right to 
sell products in the U.S. market, coupled with a negative and dormant 
intangible property right, constitutes a “use” of production intangible 
property rights in the United States regardless of the production location, 
a literal reading of section 956(c)(1)(D)(ii) would also seem to 
encompass “hypothetical” production intangible property rights in the 
United States. In particular, this statute states: “[T]he term ‘United States 
property’ means…(D) any right to the use in the United States of…(ii) an 
invention, model, or design (whether or not patented)…which is 
acquired or developed by the controlled foreign corporation for use in the 
United States [emphasis added].”31 The “whether or not patented” 
language appears to encompass a “hypothetical” right to use production 
intangible property rights in the United States. In other words, an 
investment in “United States property” may exist even though the CFC 
does not have any formal legally-protected production intangible 
property rights in the United States. Therefore, the only “use” of 
production intangible property rights in the United States as it relates to 
unpatented inventions, models or designs is the “hypothetical” right to 
use production intangible property rights in the United States. 
Assume in the above example that the CFC also opts to 
commercialize certain unpatented inventions, models and/or designs in 
its manufacturing process conducted in Country Z and sells a substantial 
portion of its production output in the United States. These production 
intangible property rights are unpatented because the CFC is unable or 
unwilling to protect such property rights under U.S. intellectual property 
laws. This leads to the question of whether or not the mere sale of the 
manufactured products in the United States should give rise to an 
investment of earnings in “United States property” even though the CFC 
has no formal legally-protected production intangible property rights in 
the United States. Alternatively stated, should the CFC still be viewed as 
having an investment in “United States property” under section 
956(c)(1)(D)(ii) because they have a “hypothetical” right to the use of 
these production intangible property rights in the United States? 
Although it is true that this “hypothetical” right to the use exists in the 
United States, it also exists in a number of other countries. 
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One reasonable interpretation of section 956(c)(1)(D) is that Congress 
was concerned with the “use” of production intangible property rights 
through physical manufacturing activities in the United States regardless 
of whether such property rights are “actual” or “hypothetical.” In other 
words, Congress wanted to capture in the “Section 956 net” the 
affirmative use and active exploitation of production intangible property 
rights (i.e., inventions, models and/or designs - whether or not patented) 
by a CFC through physical manufacturing activities in the United States, 
as well as the assignment of the CFC’s right to manufacture products in 
the United States to another party, related or unrelated, that is 
affirmatively using and actively exploiting such production intangible 
property rights (i.e., inventions, models and/or designs – whether or not 
patented) through physical manufacturing activities in the United States. 
In other words, if the physical manufacturing activities occur in the 
United States, the production intangible property rights will be 
considered “used” in the United States regardless of whether such 
property rights are “actual” or “hypothetical.” 
In addition to analyzing the language used in section 956(c)(1)(D) 
and related Treasury Regulations, it is also necessary to analyze any 
guidance issued by the IRS or contained in court rulings which have 
addressed this issue. Unfortunately, no court cases have specifically dealt 
with this issue, and the IRS has only addressed this issue on two 
separate, seemingly contradictory occasions. 
On July 19, 2002, the IRS released Private Letter Ruling 200229030 
(PLR 200229030).
32
 In PLR 200229030, various CFCs of a U.S. 
corporation owned software that was protected by copyright laws in the 
United States and several foreign countries. The CFCs produced the 
software in several foreign locations and sold the software (usually on 
disks) to customers in numerous countries, including the United States. 
Title to the software passed in the foreign country in which it was 
produced. Some purchasers of the software used the software in the 
United States. The CFCs did not own any inventory of the software in 
the United States, and the software master disks were stored at 
production facilities outside the United States. 
Under federal copyright law and local law, to guard against the 
unauthorized use and distribution of the software, the software sales were 
structured as license agreements. Purchasers of the software, however, 
did not receive any of the following rights: (1) the right to make copies 
of the software for purposes of distribution to the public by sale or other 
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending; (2) the right to 
prepare derivative computer programs based upon the software; (3) the 
right to make a public performance of the software; and (4) the right to 
publicly display the software. All other benefits and burdens of 
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ownership of the software were transferred to the purchasers of the 
software. 
Notwithstanding the CFC’s characterization of the software sales as 
“license” agreements, the IRS concluded that the transfers of the 
software by the CFCs “constitute transfers of tangible property, namely, 
copyrighted articles and not copyrighted rights.”33 In other words, the 
CFCs were engaged in transfers of tangible property (i.e., copyrighted 
articles) as opposed to transfers of intangible property rights (i.e., 
copyrighted rights). An important consideration by the IRS in rendering 
its decision was the fact that the purchasers of the software did not have 
any of the intangible property rights enumerated in Treas. Reg. §1.861-
18(c)(2). However, if the purchasers of the software had acquired one or 
more of the intangible property rights enumerated in Treas. Reg. §1.861-
18(c)(2), the transfers of the software would have been classified as a 
transfer of a copyrighted right as opposed to a copyrighted article.
34
 
More importantly, even though the software owned by the CFCs was 
protected by copyright laws in the United States, the IRS concluded that 
“the Software does not constitute a right to the use in the United States of 
a copyright, within the meaning of section 956(c)(1)(D).”35 In other 
words, the CFC’s legally-protected copyright rights in the United States, 
which encompassed the right to sell the software to U.S. purchasers 
within the United States and exclude others from reproducing the 
software within the United States, did not constitute an investment in a 
“right to the use in United States of a copyright.”36 
On March 12, 2004, the IRS released Private Letter Ruling 
200411016 (PLR 200411016),
37
 wherein PLR 200229030 was revoked, 
without an explanation, effective as of September 5, 2003. At a 
minimum, the IRS was not yet prepared to provide guidance to taxpayers 
in this area. 
For seven years, the IRS was silent on this issue. Then, on February 
11, 2011, the IRS released Chief Counsel Advice 201106007 (CCA 
201106007).
38
 In CCA 201106007, the taxpayer, a U.S. entity, was a 
distributor of information technology products and services. The 
taxpayer developed software in the United States pursuant to a cost 
sharing agreement (CSA) with its CFC. Pursuant to the CSA, the CFC 
acquired the rights to exploit copyrights in the United States, which were 
developed through the CSA. When the taxpayer completed development 
of a software product intended for sale to end-user customers, a final 
                                                          
33 Id. 
34 Those rights are: (i) The right to make copies of the computer program for purposes of 
distribution to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending; (ii) 
The right to prepare derivative computer programs based upon the copyrighted computer program; 
(iii) The right to make a public performance of the computer program; or (iv) The right to publicly 
display the computer program. 26 C.F.R. § 1.861-18(c)(2) (1998). 
35 PLR 200229030, supra note 32. 
36 Id. 
37 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200411016 (Nov. 24, 2003). 
38 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 201106007 (Feb. 11, 2011) [hereinafter GCM 201106007]. 
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version of the software code was transferred to a “gold master” disk and 
sent to the CFC. The CFC then reproduced and sold copies of the 
software to end-user customers in the United States. 
The Chief Counsel’s Office held that “the actual sales of the computer 
software copies from Sub to end-user customers in the U.S. do not in 
themselves give rise to an investment in U.S. property within the 
meaning of section 956(c)(1)(D).”39 Rather, as long as a production 
intangible property right is intended for use in the United States, “an 
investment in U.S. property arises upon the acquisition or development 
of rights to use intangible property in the U.S., not upon the actual use of 
that intangible property in the U.S.”40 In other words, if the CFC intends 
to use the copyright rights in the United States, the investment in U.S. 
property arose when the CFC developed the software pursuant to the 
CSA and legally-protected the rights to exploit the copyright in the 
United States “not in relation to whether such right is actually 
exercised.”41 
The IRS’s ruling in CCA 201106007 appears to downplay the 
significance of the Treasury Regulations in interpreting section 
956(c)(1)(D). As recited above, under section 956, the Treasury 
Regulations provide that: 
Whether a right described in this subdivision [an 
intangible property right] has been acquired or 
developed for use in the United States by any person is 
to be determined from all the facts and circumstances of 
each case. As a general rule, a right actually used 
principally in the United States will be considered to 
have been acquired or developed for use in the United 
States in the absence of affirmative evidence showing 
that the right was not so acquired or developed for such 
use [emphasis added].
42
 
Alternatively stated, a right not actually used principally in the 
United States will not be considered to have been acquired or developed 
for use in the United States in the absence of affirmative evidence 
showing that the right was so acquired or developed for such use. 
Therefore, the conclusion reached in CCA 201106007 is only 
supportable in two circumstances: (1) the copyright rights were actually 
used principally by the CFC in the United States and the CFC is unable 
to present affirmative evidence showing that such property rights were 
not acquired or developed with the intent to use principally in the United 
States, or (2) the copyright rights were not actually used principally by 
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the CFC in the United States but the IRS is able to present affirmative 
evidence showing that such property rights were acquired or developed 
by the CFC with the intent to use principally in the United States. 
Although it is true that the actual use principally of the copyright 
rights by the CFC in the United States is irrelevant upon a showing of 
affirmative evidence that the CFC acquired or developed such property 
rights with the intent to use principally in the United States, the CCA 
ruling does not apply the appropriate standard in its definition of “U.S. 
property.” In particular, the ruling states: 
[B]oth the statute and regulations define U.S. 
property in relation to whether a CFC develops 
intangible property intended for use in the U.S. or 
acquires the right to use intangible property in the U.S. –
not in relation to whether such right is actually exercised 
[emphasis added].
43
 
The key issue is not whether a CFC acquires or develops intangible 
property intended for use in the United States, but rather whether the 
CFC acquires or develops intangible property intended for use 
principally in the United States. Although the CFC may have acquired or 
developed the copyright rights with the intent to use such property rights 
in the United States by transferring its software to U.S. purchasers and 
excluding others from reproducing its software, the critical issue is 
whether the CFC acquired or developed the copyright rights with the 
intent to use principally such property rights in the United States. 
In general, as the term suggests, “production intangible property 
rights” are acquired or developed with the intent to use principally in the 
production process. That is, without the affirmative use and active 
exploitation of the production intangible property rights (e.g., patents, 
inventions, models, designs, secret formulas and processes) in the 
production process, there would be no products to sell; hence, no need to 
legally-protect the right to sell such products in a foreign jurisdiction or 
exclude others from actively exploiting such property rights in a foreign 
jurisdiction. That is, these production intangible property rights are 
acquired or developed with the intent to use principally in the production 
process and, arguably, secondarily used in the jurisdiction of 
consumption – i.e., sell products and exclude others from actively 
exploiting such property rights in the jurisdiction of consumption. 
Brewer and Reynolds made the following observation: 
[W]hen a distributor merely sells a product in the 
United States that is produced under patent by an 
unrelated manufacturer, it’s highly unusual for the 
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distributor to require a license to use the patent for the 
product. By way of contrast, the distributor may well 
demand a license to use a trademark or trade name for 
the product. Thus, as a matter of custom and usage, it 
would not seem that the mere sale of a product in the 
United States should be construed as the “use” of a 
patent for the product within the meaning of section 956. 
. . . . 
It seems more likely that Congress intended the word 
“use” to mean, narrowly, to produce a product in the 
United States, using a patent, copyright, invention, secret 
formula or process, etc., or to license a production 
intangible to someone else that will produce the product 
in the United States. Under this view, production 
intangibles, such as patents, secret formulas, and secret 
processes, would not be treated as having been acquired 
for use in the United States, and hence would fall outside 
the ambit of section 956, if the plan for acquiring the 
intangibles was for the products involved to be produced 
outside the United States.
44
 
In other words, the phrase “use in the United States” in section 
956(c)(1)(D) should be narrowly construed to mean those production 
intangible property rights that are used in actual production activities in 
the United States, and not in situations where the production intangible 
property rights are used to produce such products outside of the United 
States for sale in the United States. 
So, if we accept this construction of section 956(c)(1)(D), how do we 
reconcile it with CCA 201106007? One conceivable explanation would 
be to focus on the jurisdictions in which the right to use the production 
intangible property rights are being affirmatively used and actively 
exploited. Once known, a determination would need to be made as to 
whether the right to the use of the production intangible property rights 
in the United States makes the greatest economic contribution to profits 
relative to the other jurisdictions. If the right to the use of the production 
intangible property rights in the United States makes the greatest 
economic contribution to profits relative to the other jurisdictions, such 
property rights should be considered to have been acquired or developed 
by the CFC with the intent to use principally in the United States absent 
affirmation evidence showing that such property rights were not acquired 
or developed with the intent to use principally in the United States. 
Therefore, depending on the specific facts and circumstances, it is 
                                                          
44 Brewer and Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1796-97. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW      VOLUME 9 
101 
 
possible that the location of the production activities may not make the 
greatest economic contribution to profits. 
For instance, if the specific production location provides insignificant 
economic advantages, such as merely copying a software code, a strong 
argument could be made that the copyright rights were acquired or 
developed with the intent to use principally in the jurisdiction where the 
software is sold and such property rights are legally protected under 
intellectual property law. Of these jurisdictions, if the United States 
represents the largest market for software sales, the right to the use in the 
United States of the copyright rights should be considered to have been 
acquired or developed by the CFC with the intent to use principally in 
the United States absent affirmation evidence showing that such property 
rights were not acquired or developed with the intent to use principally in 
the United States. However, if the specific production location provides 
significant economic advantages, such as access to capital, key 
management personnel, costs of production, logistics, skilled labor, 
regulatory environment, and access to raw materials, a strong argument 
could be made that the production intangible property rights (e.g., 
patents, copyrights, inventions, models, designs, secret formulas, 
processes) were acquired or developed by the CFC with the intent to use 
principally in the jurisdiction where the production activities occur.
45
 
Applying this logic to CCA 201106007, one could reasonably 
interpret the ruling to stand for the proposition that the legally-protected 
right to exploit the copyright rights in the United States provided the 
greatest economic contribution to profits relative to the reproduction of 
the software outside the United States. Therefore, the copyright rights 
should be considered to have been acquired or developed by the CFC 
with the intent to use principally in the United States. Likewise, one 
could reasonably conclude in our original example that the CFC’s 
decision to commercialize its production intangible property rights (i.e., 
patents, copyrights, inventions, models, designs, secret formulas and 
processes, and other similar property rights) by manufacturing its 
products in Country Z provided the greatest economic contribution to 
profits versus the “use” of such property rights in the United States – i.e., 
mere right to sell products in U.S. market coupled with a negative and 
dormant production intangible property right. Therefore, these 
production intangible property rights should be considered to have been 
acquired or developed by the CFC with the intent to use principally in 
country Z as opposed to the United States. 
If we move outside the context of section 956(c)(1)(D) and analyze 
other code sections that have dealt with the issue of where production 
intangible property rights are “used,” it may provide some useful 
guidance in discerning the meaning of “used principally” in the United 
States. For instance, it may be helpful to consider the issue of “use” in 
                                                          
45 See also Sprague and Determann, supra note 30. 
WINTER 2012                           WHAT LIES BENEATH SECTION 956(C)(1)(D)? 
102 
 
the context of sections 861(a)(4) and 862(a)(4), which provides rules to 
determine the source of royalty income.
46
 
In Revenue Ruling 72-232 (Rev. Rul. 72-232),
47
 a nonresident 
individual prepared a manuscript, as an independent contractor, for 
certain textbooks to be used in the public schools in Country Y, the 
jurisdiction in which the nonresident individual resided. The nonresident 
individual granted to M, a U.S. corporation, a license to print and 
distribute these textbooks. The textbooks were printed in the United 
States by M, and the textbooks were protected by copyright laws in the 
United States and Country Y. The textbooks were not designed for use in 
the United States and were sold exclusively in Country Y. The 
nonresident individual received royalties from M for the textbooks sold 
in Country Y. 
In Rev. Rul. 72-232, the IRS concluded as follows: 
In the instant case there is no commercial publication 
of the textbooks within the United States in that the 
textbooks are not sold within the United States. Without 
such commercial publication M is engaged solely in 
printing or manufacturing books within the United 
States, which books are later sold in the foreign country. 
In the vending of such books in the foreign country, the 
foreign country copyrights are used and not the United 
States copyright.
48
  
Accordingly, the IRS held that the royalties paid by M to the nonresident 
individual represented foreign-source income.
49
 
Rev. Rul. 72-232 appears to ignore the fact that M is also using the 
copyright rights in the United States. In other words, pursuant to the 
terms of the license granted by the nonresident individual, M clearly 
“used” the copyright rights in the United States when it printed the 
textbooks and, possibly, when M distributed the textbooks if title to the 
books passed in the United States. In an attempt to rationale this ruling, 
Sprague and Determann made the following observation: 
[P]erhaps the preferable approach would be to 
acknowledge the U.S. copyright use, but conclude that 
the location of the act of printing (at least in this case) 
was not as economically significant for source-of-
income purposes as the ability to access the foreign 
market. The analysis then could conclude that while both 
U.S. and foreign copyright rights of distribution were 
                                                          
46 Id. 
47 Rev. Rul. 72-232, 1972-1 C.B. 276. 
48 Id. at 277. 
49 Id. 
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implicated, the foreign rights were of more significance 
in this case. This perhaps is what was intended by the 
statement that the U.S. activities do not constitute 
“commercial” publication, a qualification that is not 
particularly relevant under copyright law, which 
prohibits any form of reproduction and publication.
50
 
In other words, the copyright rights were used in both the United 
States and Country Y. However, the copyright rights were used 
principally in Country Y. If we accept this interpretation, the guidance 
provided by this Ruling may support the conclusion reached by the IRS 
in CCA 201106007. Specifically, in selling the computer software copies 
exclusively to end-user customers in the United States, the CFC was 
using principally the U.S. copyright rights as opposed to the foreign 
copyright rights. With that said, the IRS in CCA 201106007 did not cite 
any authority, including Rev. Rul. 72-232, for its conclusion.  
In Sanchez v. Comm’r.,51 the Tax Court dealt with patents rights as 
opposed to copyright rights and the source of royalty income flowing 
from such property rights under sections 861(a)(4) and 862(a)(4). In this 
case, Mr. Sanchez, a nonresident individual, invented a process for 
refining sugar which involved the use of a chemical reagent called 
Sucro-Blanc. He obtained U.S. and foreign patents on both the process 
and the chemical reagent. Mr. Sanchez then granted Sucro-Blanc, Inc., a 
U.S. corporation, an exclusive worldwide license to commercially 
exploit these patents, including the right to sublicense such patents, in 
exchange for royalty payments. Sucro-Blanc, Inc. decided to 
commercialize these patents by manufacturing the patented chemical 
reagent exclusively in the United States and selling it to U.S. and foreign 
customers, coupled with a nonexclusive sublicense to use the patented 
process at no charge at their sugar refineries, some of which were outside 
the United States. All sales of the patented chemical reagent were 
consummated within the United States.
52
 
Under the worldwide license agreement, the royalty payments made 
by Sucro-Blanc, Inc. to Mr. Sanchez were based solely on the sales of the 
patented chemical reagent. Mr. Sanchez claimed that a portion of the 
royalties received from Sucro-Blanc, Inc. should be foreign-source 
income to the extent the sales of the patented chemical reagent were for 
use outside the United States. According to the Tax Court, Mr. Sanchez’s 
position was as follows: 
[T]he exclusive license granted by him covered not 
only the product, but the process, which is true; and that 
the sublicenses granted by Sucro-Blanc, Inc., similarly 
                                                          
50 Sprague and Determann, supra note 30, at 359. 
51 6 T.C. 1141 (1946), aff’d, 162 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1947). 
52 Id. at 1141-44. 
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covered both process and product. From this he argues 
that, although no charge was allocated to the process, as 
distinguished from the product, either in his contract 
with the corporation or the corporation’s contract with 
its licensees, nevertheless, all the corporation’s income 
arising from the sale of the product, and all of 
petitioner’s income derived from the corporation and 
measured by such sales, was received for the use of both 
process and product, and, to the extent that the process 
and product were used in foreign countries, was income 
from without the United States.
53
 
In other words, Sucro-Blanc, Inc. was able to extract a higher 
purchase price on the sale of the chemical reagent from its foreign 
customers by foregoing a separate charge for the use the patented process 
at their sugar refineries; hence, the royalty income attributable to these 
sales should be treated as foreign-source income derived from the use of 
both process and product in such foreign jurisdictions.  
The Tax Court disagreed with Mr. Sanchez and held that none of the 
royalty income received by Mr. Sanchez from Sucro-Blanc, Inc. 
constituted income from sources outside the United States. In particular, 
the Tax Court held: 
In this argument petitioner minimizes the salient fact 
that he himself had no relationship whatsoever with any 
person using the process or product in foreign countries. 
His contractual relationship out of which his income 
here in question was derived was with an American 
corporation, Sucro-Blanc, Inc., which disposed of the 
use of the process in this country and made the product 
necessary to the process in this country . . . . The fact 
that the New York corporation received a part of these 
funds from sales made by the corporation to its 
customers doing business in foreign countries or from 
sublicenses which it had the right to make, granted by 
the corporation to persons who used the process licensed 
in foreign countries, cannot affect the characterization of 
the income derived by petitioner from the New York 
corporation. 
Even if we were of the opinion that the source of the 
payments to Sucro-Blanc, Inc., would be determinative 
of the source of the income derived from Sucro-Blanc, 
Inc., by petitioner, we would still be of the opinion that 
                                                          
53 Id. at 1145-46.  
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petitioner’s income here in question would be from 
sources within the United States. 
[I]t is sufficient to establish that the corporation 
chose not to charge anything for the installation and use 
of the patented process by its licensees, looking to the 
sales of the product for its remuneration. The corporate 
income, therefore, was, by design, derived from the 
sales, not the installation or use of the process, and, 
consequently, the source of the payments to petitioner 
here in question, upon the hypothesis that the source of 
the income of the corporation is controlling, would be 
the sales of Sucro-Blanc. Therefore, the place where the 
sales of the product were consummated would determine 
the source of the petitioner’s income.54 
Although Sucro-Blanc, Inc. exercised its rights under the U.S. patent 
by manufacturing and consummating the sales of the chemical reagent in 
the United States, it also exercised its rights under the foreign patents 
when it sold the chemical reagent and a nonexclusive sublicense to use 
the patented process, to customers in foreign jurisdictions which afforded 
such product and process legal protection under such jurisdictions’ 
intellectual property laws. Furthermore, Sucro-Blanc, Inc. possessed a 
negative and dormant intangible property right under the foreign patents 
to exclude others from affirmatively using and actively exploiting its 
patented product and process in such foreign jurisdictions. Despite this, 
the Tax Court did not address the effect of intellectual property law or 
the foreign market being exploited. Rather, the Tax Court ruled solely on 
the fact that Sucro-Blanc, Inc.’s commercial activities were located in the 
United States when it held that Mr. Sanchez’s royalties were U.S.-source 
income. 
In our original example, the CFC neither manufactured its products in 
the United States nor licensed its production intangible property rights 
for use in the United States. Therefore, the application of the Tax Court’s 
ruling in the Sanchez case, as well as the aforementioned interpretation 
of Rev. Rul. 72-232, to the facts in our original example would appear to 
support a conclusion that the CFC’s mere right to sell its products 
produced with its production intangible property rights in Country Z in 
the U.S. market, coupled with a negative and dormant production 
intangible property right, does not constitute a right to the use in the 
United States of such property rights absent affirmation evidence 
showing that such property rights were acquired or developed with the 
intent to use principally in the United States. Though not a primary 
source of authority, BNA 929 states that a right which is used principally 
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in the United States “would probably be in the form of either exploitation 
of the right in a U.S. branch operation of the CFC itself or in the form of 
a license of the right to another party who uses it in the United States.”55 
Analyses of language used in other code sections that deal with 
production intangibles provide additional support for this position.
56
 For 
instance, section 863(b)(2) and Treas. Reg. §1.863-3 dealing with the 
allocation of income between production and sales activities (50/50 
Method). In particular, Treas. Reg. §1.863-3(c)(1)(i)(C) states that “a 
tangible production asset will be considered located where the asset is 
physically located. An intangible production asset will be considered 
located where the tangible production assets owned by the taxpayer to 
which it relates are located.” Example 2 of Treas. Reg. §1.863-3(c)(1)(iv) 
deals with intangible property that is employed by a corporation with 
production assets both within and without the United States. In this 
example, the patented process only applied to the production activity 
performed in the United States; hence, it was treated as located in the 
United States. 
This position is also supported by section 954(c)(3)(A)(i) and Treas. 
Reg. §1.954-2(b)(4)(vii) dealing with foreign personal holding company 
income – the “Dividends and Interest Exclusion.” Pursuant to section 
954(c)(3)(A)(i), the term “foreign personal holding company income” 
does not include “dividends and interest received from a related person 
which (I) is a corporation created or organized under the laws of the 
same foreign country under the laws of which the controlled foreign 
corporation is created or organized, and (II) has a substantial part of its 
assets used in its trade or business located in such same foreign country 
[emphasis added].” Although the statute simply refers to the location of 
“use” of the payor’s trade or business assets (tangible and intangible), the 
Treasury Regulations interpret that language with reference to physical 
operations. More specifically, for purposes of applying the substantial 
assets test, the Treasury Regulations define the location of intangible 
property as follows: 
Intangible property…is considered located entirely in 
the payor’s country of incorporation for a quarter of the 
taxable year only if the payor conducts all of its 
activities in connection with the use or exploitation of 
the property in that country during that entire quarter. 
For this purpose, the country in which the activities 
connected to the use or exploitation of the property are 
conducted is the country in which the expenses 
associated with these activities are incurred. Expenses 
incurred in connection with the use or exploitation of an 
item of intangible property are included in the 
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computation…if they would be deductible under section 
162 or includible in inventory costs or the cost of goods 
sold if the payor were a domestic corporation.
57
 
The Treasury Regulations further provide: 
If the payor conducts its activities in connection with 
the use or exploitation of an item of intangible property, 
including goodwill…during a quarter of the taxable year 
both in its country of incorporation and elsewhere, then 
the value of the intangible considered located in the 
payor’s country of incorporation during that quarter is a 
percentage of the value of the item as of the close of the 
quarter. That percentage equals the ratio that the 
expenses incurred by the payor . . . during the entire 
quarter by reason of activities that are connected with the 
use or exploitation of the item of intangible property and 
are conducted in the payor’s country of incorporation 
bear to all expenses incurred by the payor during the 
entire quarter by reason of all such activities 
worldwide.
58
 
The production assets test under the 50/50 method of section 
863(b)(2) and the “same country” dividend and interest exclusion of 
section 964(c)(3)(A)(i) reflect the long-standing position that production 
intangibles property rights run with the production activities that 
affirmatively use and actively exploit such property rights as opposed to 
the market where the products produced with these production intangible 
property rights are sold. 
In our original example, if the IRS were to conclude that the CFC’s 
right to sell its products produced in Country Z in the U.S. market, 
coupled with the negative and dormant production intangible property 
right, constitutes “United States property” pursuant to section 
956(c)(1)(D), it would appear reasonable to allow the CFC the right to 
allocate its adjusted basis in such production intangibles between the 
United States and all foreign jurisdictions in which the production 
intangible property rights are “used.” Such allocation would include 
country Z where the production intangible property rights are 
affirmatively used and actively exploited in the physical production 
process. In other words, to the extent the CFC is using its production 
intangible property rights outside the United States via its affirmative use 
and actively exploitation of such property rights in its production process 
and its sale of products in all non-U.S. markets, the IRS should allow any 
                                                          
57 26 C.F.R. § 1.954-2(b)(4)(vii)(A) (2009). 
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reasonable allocation methodology consistent with the principles of 
section 482 to allocate a CFC’s adjusted basis in its production 
intangibles between U.S. and non-U.S. jurisdictions. 
The taxpayer’s right to apply a reasonable allocation methodology 
consistent with the principles of section 482 is supported by section 
954(c)(3)(A)(ii) dealing with foreign personal holding company income. 
This statute provides that the term “foreign personal holding company 
income” does not include “rents and royalties from a corporation that is a 
related person for the use of, or the privilege of using, property within 
the country under the laws of which the controlled foreign corporation is 
created or organized.”59 The Treasury Regulations further provide as 
follows: 
If the payor uses the property both in the controlled 
foreign corporation’s country of incorporation and 
elsewhere, the part of the rent or royalty attributable 
(determined under the principles of section 482) to the 
use of, or the privilege of using, the property outside 
such country of incorporation is included in the 
computation of foreign personal holding company 
income. [emphasis added].
60
 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
A literal reading of section 956(c)(1)(D), coupled with a review of the 
statute’s legislative history and a comparison of the language used in 
other code sections, provide strong support for the conclusion that the 
scope of intangible property rights under section 956(c)(1)(D) is limited 
to production intangible property rights. 
With respect to whether production intangible property rights were 
acquired or developed by a CFC for use in the United States, the critical 
issue is whether the CFC developed or acquired such property rights with 
the intent to use principally in the United States. Even if it is shown that 
the CFC acquired or developed production intangible property rights 
with the intent to use such property rights in the United States (i.e., sell 
products and exclude other from exploiting such property rights in the 
U.S market), the critical issue is whether the CFC acquired or developed 
such property rights with the intent to use principally in the United 
States. 
In general, production intangible property rights are considered 
acquired or developed with the intent to use principally in the production 
process. Therefore, section 956(c)(1)(D) should be narrowly construed to 
mean those production intangible property rights (e.g., patents, 
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60 26 C.F.R. § 1.954-2(b)(5)(ii)(B) (2009). 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW      VOLUME 9 
109 
 
copyrights, inventions, models, designs, secret formulas, processes) that 
are used in production activities conducted in the United States. Stated 
differently, production intangible property rights should be considered 
acquired or developed with the intent to use principally in the 
jurisdiction where the production activities actually occur, not 
necessarily in the jurisdiction where the products are eventually sold. 
However, if the IRS is able to present affirmative evidence to show 
that the specific production location provides insignificant economic 
advantages, such as merely reproducing software, a strong argument 
could be made that the production intangible property rights were 
acquired or developed with the intent to use principally in the 
jurisdiction where the product is sold and such property rights are legally 
protected under intellectual property law. In these instances, if the United 
States represents the largest market for the product sales, the “right to the 
use” in the United States of the production intangible property rights 
should be considered to have been acquired or developed by the CFC 
with the intent to use principally in the United States absent affirmation 
evidence showing that such property rights were not acquired or 
developed with the intent to use principally in the United States. 
